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Abstract. With the development of presentation attacks, Automated Fingerprint
Recognition Systems(AFRSs) are vulnerable to presentation attack. Thus, numer-
ous methods of presentation attack detection(PAD) have been proposed to ensure
the normal utilization of AFRS. However, the demand of large-scale presentation
attack images and the low-level generalization ability always astrict existing PAD
methods’ actual performances. Therefore, we propose a novel Zero-Shot Presen-
tation Attack Detection Model to guarantee the generalization of the PAD model.
The proposed ZSPAD-Model based on generative model does not utilize any neg-
ative samples in the process of establishment, which ensures the robustness for
various types or materials based presentation attack. Different from other auto-
encoder based model, the Fine-grained Map architecture is proposed to refine the
reconstruction error of the auto-encoder networks and a task-specific gaussian
model is utilized to improve the quality of clustering. Meanwhile, in order to im-
prove the performance of the proposed model, 9 confidence scores are discussed
in this article. Experimental results showed that the ZSPAD-Model is the state of
the art for ZSPAD, and the MS-Score is the best confidence score. Compared with
existing methods, the proposed ZSPAD-Model performs better than the feature-
based method and under the multi-shot setting, the proposed method overper-
forms the learning based method with little training data. When large training
data is available, their results are similar.
Keywords: Presentation Attack Detection, Zero-Shot, Optical Coherence Tech-
nology, Unsupervised Learning System.
1 Introduction
The rise in the number of intelligent device terminals coupled with increased convenient
payment tools, has resulted in an exponential growth in Automated Fingerprint Recog-
nition Systems(AFRSs) [8,12,40]. The purpose of AFRSs is to ensure a reliable and
accurate user authentication [12] for various applications such as mobile payments [13]
and access control [21]. However, current AFRSs are easily spoofed by presentation
attack (PA) [18] made from silica gel or other low cost materials [28,38].
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For presentation attack detection(PAD), numerous methods have been proposed and
they can be roughly divided into two categories. The first category of method is on the
basis of software. These methods exploit dynamic behaviors of live fingertips(e.g., per-
spiration [22] and ridge distortion [3]) and the static features (e.g. textural features)
[26,34] for PAD. For example, the approach proposed by Antonelli et al. [3] required
users to move the finger while pressing it against the scanner surface and detects the PA
based on skin distortion. Nikam et al. [34] proposed the textural-characteristic-based
method, whose classification rate ranges from 94.35% to 98.12%. Although it is con-
venient to deploy these software based approaches and the correspinding cost is at a low
level, the research [5] shows that these software based methods can be easily spoofed
by the Generative Adversarial Networks(GAN) [5].
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Fig. 1. An example of cross-section fingerprint image of Bonafide and PA: (a). The cross-section
fingertip image marked with biological structure [32]. (b). The cross-section images of Bonafide
(in the first row) and Presentation Attack (in the second row) made by transparent silica gel. (c).
The X-Y tomographic images of the internal fingerprint [30].
Different from the software based methods, hardware based methods pay more at-
tention to capture the liveness characteristics from fingertips by special sensors (e.g.,
multispectral sensor [35,36], high-resolution sensor [42], binocular stereo vision sen-
sor [29] and Optical Coherence Technology (OCT) [20]). Nixon et al.[35] proposed a
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spectroscopy-based device to obtain the spectral feature of the fingertip, which is proved
to be able to distinguish between the PA and real fingerprint. The pulse-oximetry-based
device, which involves the source of light originating from a probe at two wavelengths,
was proposed by Reddy et al. [36] to capture the percentage of oxygen in the blood as
well as the heart pulse rate for liveness detection (i.e. PAD). Zhao et al. [42] proposed
a method for the pore extraction using high-resolution sensor and applied it for live-
ness detection. The 3D fingerprint using binocular stereo vision proposed by Liu and
Zhang can be utilized for liveness detection. Liu et al. [28] proposed a method to ob-
tain the depth-double-peak feature and sub-single-peak feature for PAD using optical-
coherence-technology-based device, which achieves 100% accuracy over all four types
of artificial fingerprints. Among them, OCT-based device extracts the internal surface
of fingerprint and it can be utilized for liveness detection and identification at the same
time.
The difference between OCT and other devices has led to the emergence of PAD
using OCT as an active area of research [6,9,11,12,14,20,28,33]. OCT-based device pro-
vides an internal representation of the fingertip skin rather than a simple feature (e.g.,
spectral feature, the percentage of oxygen and heart pulse rate). And the depth informa-
tion and representation formation of such internal fingerprints has excellent capability
of PAD [12,28]. Figure. 1 shows the samples captured by OCT. The biological finger-
tip structure of bonafide(real data) including Epidermis and Dermis shown in Figure.
1(a) are captured by OCT in the form of B-scan and A-line. Each A-line, which reflects
the capability of sensor to image the subsurface characteristics of the skin, reaches to
a penetration depth and corresponds to pixels along depth direction. B-scan, namely
a cross-section image, is then formed by all A-lines scanning along the horizontal di-
rection. For 3D scanning, a slow scanning galvanometer is employed to obtain 400
B-scans. Thus, the 3D fingerprint image captured by our device consists of four hun-
dreds longitudinal(X-Z) fingertip images with spatial size of 1500 × 400 × 500 pixels
to quantify a real fingerprint area of 15mm× 15mm× 1.8mm, as shown in Fig. 1(c). As
illustrated in Figure. 1(b), the presentations of bonafide and PA are different in B-scan.
Therefore, this representation is generally useful for PAD.
For the topic of PAD, there are two challenges: the first challenge here is the fea-
ture extraction from the B-scans to distinguish the PAs from bonafides. The second
challenge is the establishment of the auto-PAD model, which maps the features to the
liveness confidence. Ideally, for better generalization, a model for PAD using OCT must
learn to discover the alignments between the PA and the bonafide. For example, in Fig.
2(a)(b), the model is determined by the training set including PA made by copper(seen)
as well as bonafide and we want the model to distinguish as well PA made by emul-
sion(unseen) & bonafide. However, current evaluation methodology [12,28] focuses
only on class-based PAD, i.e., seen presentation attacks made of various instruments
and bonafides are classified into different categories by the model. However, unseen
presentation attack is difficult to detect. For example, in Fig. 2(a), unseen presentation
attack made of emulsion has different characteristics from bonafide and PA made of
copper and there is no guarantee that the model can detect emulsion PA. This leads to
the dependence of the model on data and the security risks of AFRSs.
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Fig. 2. The pipelines of PAD: (a). The process of PAD. (b). Traditional PAD Model. (c). Zero-Shot
based PAD Model.
Considering the PAD problem, presentation attack instruments (PAIs) are difficult
to collect and it is impossible to master all potential PAIs. Therefore, the model with
low data dependence is more suitable for PAD. In this paper, we propose a Zero-Shot
framework for PAD (ZSPAD) using OCT. Since we can get a large number of bonafide
data in the AFRSs, the proposed ZSPAD only requires bonafide samples to complete
PAD. Without any PA for reference, the method can have better generalization and
solve the detection problem caused by the gap between different PAIs (presentation
attack instruments).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the
state-of-the-art techniques in PAD using OCT and Zero-Shot learning(ZSL). Subse-
quently, in Section 3, we introduces the general idea for ZSPAD, the corresponding
specific adaptations to our model and the feasible confidence scores for presentation at-
tack detection. Then Secition 4 shows the empirical evaluation of our proposed method
in ZSPAD setting and the pros & cons of existing state-of-the-art PAD methods. Finally,
we summarize the topic of ZSPAD as well as our proposed approach in Section 5.
2 Related Work
Since we propose a Zero-Shot framework for the PAD task, we briefly review the liter-
ature from both PAD using OCT as well as Zero Shot learning in this section.
As shown in Fig. 2(b), there are two typical approaches [28,12] for presentation
attack detection using OCT [6,9,11,12,14,20,28,33]. The first one is based on feature
extraction. Liu et al. [28] defined two features for PAD, namely depth-double-peak
and sub-single-peak, by the observation and comparison of the A-line between PA and
bonafide. Depth-double-peak feature refers that there must be two and only two peaks in
one A-line which reflects the pysical structure of real fingertip. While sub-single-peak
feature means that there should be a peak in the A-line intercepted before the maximum
peak. This method achieves 100% accuracy over all four types of PAIs. The second cat-
egory of PAD is based on learning model. Chugh and Jain [12] develop and evaluate a
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PA detector based on deep convolutional neural network(CNN). Input to CNN are local
patches extracted from the B-scans captured from THORLabs Telesto series spectral-
domain OCT scanner. Chugh and Jain’s approach achieves a true detection rate(TDR)
of 99.73% on a database of 3,413 bonafides(8 different PAIs) and 357 PA OCT scans.
Among them, the feature based method is sensitive to the noise and the its robustness is
poor. The learning based method are data-dependent, which limits the scope of the ap-
plication. In the topic of PAD, it is hard to collect presentation attack instruments(PAIs).
Therefore, the robustness and generalization of these methods can not be guaranteed.
It is promising to propose a PAD method without the dependence on any PA data.
This classification task without class samples belongs to the category of Zero-Shot
learning. Zero-Shot learning has been applied in various research areas [2,10,15,25,27,39,37],
such as face verification [25], object categorization [4] and image retrieval [24]. The
tasks of detecting the classes without any seen data are called Zero-Shot learning (ZSL).
Therefore, the main challenge of ZSL is how to generalize the models to detect the novel
object categories without accessing any labeled instances of these categories [17]. ZSL
generally includes inductive ZSL [2,10] and transductive ZSL [16,41]. For the inductive
ZSL, only data of the source categories are available during the training phase. While
the transductive ZSL method is under an open-set setting that both the labeled source
images and unlabeled target images are available for training [41]. Unfortunately, it is
difficult for both inductive and transductive methods to be directly applied for the un-
seen class detection. They should learn domain-invariance and generalize feature rep-
resentation for domain adaptation [17]. The feature representation for ZSL is usually
based on semantic attributes including parts, shape, materials, etc [16,25,24]. For ex-
ample, an attribute ’has wings’ refers to the intrinsic characteristic of an instance or a
class (e.g., bird) [16].
However, for presentation attack detection, PA belongs to unseen data. Therefore, it
is very difficult for PAD to find the reasonable semantic attributes to distinguish between
bonafides and PAs. As shown in Fig. 2(c), we propose a novel Zero-Shot framework
under a Zero-PA setting, where the Zero-Shot PAD model is trained without any PAs.
Specifically, an auto-encoder(AE) network is trained to reconstruct bonafide B-scans,
and the trained model is utilized to evaluate the reconstruction error of PA and bonafide
B-scan. Since there is high-level noise and invalid areas in B-scan image disturbing the
reconstruction error, we propose a Fine-grained Map architecture(FineMap) to provide
a constraint for B-scan in order to obtain small reconstruction error. Considering that
each fingertip has multiple B-scans, we utilized the Gaussian Model to estimate the
probability density of the reconstruction errors of a fingertips. Finally, three detection
methods including, statistical feature, probability density and divergence based confi-
dence scores are proposed for ZSPAD. Our experimental results show that the proposed
ZSPAD-Model performs better than the feature-based method. And under the multi-
shot setting, the proposed method overperforms the learning based method with little
training data. When large training data is available, their results is similar.
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3 Presentation Attack Detection using ZSPAD-Model
As shown in Fig.2(a)(b), the existing approaches mentioned in the Section 1 and Sec-
tion 2 for presentation attack detection requires PAIs to establish the feature extraction
or supervised neural network model. Therefore, the existing approaches can not gen-
eralize well to the ZSPAD task. We now propose an Zero-Shot learning based method
for ZSPAD. Fig. 3 shows the pipeline of our proposed method, namely ZSPAD-Model,
for this problem. ZSPAD is divided into two parts, off-line part and on-line part. The
off-line part is utilized to train the auto-encoder network, both input and output are the
B-scans of bonafides. The on-line part is used to test the samples. The main motiva-
tion for such an approach is that we can get the precise probability distribution of the
bonafide B-scans through the auto-encoder network, and the probability distribution of
the bonafide can be utilized for the detection of PA. Due to the interference of the invalid
area and the speckle noise of the B-scans, it is difficult for simple auto-encoder struc-
ture to estimate accurate probability distribution. Additionally, a series of B-scans are
derived from OCT [28], when the fingertips or PAIs are scanned. But the auto-encoder
network can not utilize the multi B-scans’ information in a reasonable way. Therefore,
we propose a series of architectures and approaches to solve the above issues.
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Fig. 3. An overview of the proposed Zero-Shot based fingerprint presentation attack detection
approach utilizing the auto-encoder network.
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Below, we first introduce the off-line training part for ZSPAD in Section 3.1. Specif-
ically, we provide a preprocessing method to reduce the speckle noise. An auto-encoder
network is proposed to evaluate the probability distribution. In Section 3.2, we present
a PAD-specific approaches to promote the precision of the gaussian model using Fine-
grained Map. Finally, we describe the confidence scores based on the statistical features
and probability distribution for PAD using Gaussian Model in Section 3.3.
3.1 Off-line Part for ZSPAD
In this section, we first introduce the on-liine part for PAD as shown in Fig. 3. The pro-
posed off-line part of PAD approach includes two stages: a preprocessing stage(image
resize and noise removal) and an auto-encoder network(estimate the probability distri-
bution of the single B-scan).
Preprocessing Optical Coherence Tomography(OCT) scans(B-scans) are RGB images
with height = 500 pixels and width = 1500 pixels(see Fig.3). These images contain
speckle noise, which reduces the performance subsequent processing. Firstly, in order to
reduce the computation and memory for subsequent processing, we utilize the bilinear
interpolation to resize the B-scan to a smaller size(height= 256,width = 768) and con-
vert them to gray images. Then, inspired by [12], we employ Non-Local Means denois-
ing [7] to remove noise by replacing the intensity of a pixel with an average intensity of
similar pixels that may not be present close to each other(non-local) in the image. More
concretely, the implementation of Non-Local Means denosing is based on opencv with
filter-Strength = 19, templateWindowSize = 7 and searchWindowSize = 21.
Auto-encoder Network for ZSPAD A general idea to achieve ZSPAD is to find the
probability distribution of bonafide Pb and images, which do not fit Pb, are identified as
presentation attack. Therfore, ZSPAD problem can be described as finding a model F ,
whose input is x and output is the Pb(x),
F (x) = Pb(x) (1)
where F is a generative model. Several models such as Gaussian Mixture Model(GMM)
and Hidden Markov Model(HMM) can be utilized for this problem. However, consid-
ering the size of the B-scans and the complexity of the ZSPAD, these methods can
not handle the high-dimensional data x (B-scan), and are difficult to get the precise
Pb(x). Thus, we propose an auto-encoder based Model FAE . Fig.3 shows the structure
of auto-encoder network. The auto-encoder network is composed of two parts, encoder
and decoder. Encoder encodes the input x and extracts the features of the x. Decoder
utilizes these features to reconstruct the input x. Both encoder and decoder consists of
multi convolution layers. Fig. 4 shows the architecture of the auto-encoder network uti-
lized in this paper. Specifically, decoder consists of 5 Resnet-blocks [19] and each block
contains three atrous convolution layers(rate=1,2,5, kernel size=(3,3)) and one convo-
lution layer (kernel size=(3,3), step=2). Encoder is composed of 6 block and each block
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consists of two layers, bilinear resize layer and convolution layer (kernel size=(3,3)).
The target of FAE is given by,
FAE(x, θ) = x (2)
where the both input and output of FAE is x and the θ is the parameters of auto-encoder
network. This network’s update strategy is described as,
min
θ
RAE(x, θ) = ||FAE(x, θ)− x||2 (3)
where RAE is the reconstruction error for the FAE . As can be seen, FAE does not
provide the probability distribution P of x explicitly. But FAE has a such property that,
the probability distribution of x is related to reconstruction errorRAE . Given an unseen
B-scan xi, when the reconstruction error of xi is small, xi is close to the P, when the
reconstruction error is large, xi is far away from P. Thus, the ZSPAD problem is further
transformed into making the probability P of auto-encoder network close to Pb. To
solve this problem, only the bonafide data set Smodel is utilized to train the FAE and it
is described as,
min
θ
RAE(x, θ) s.t. x ∈ Smodel (4)
Then, we can get the reconstruction error R∗AE(x) of the trained auto-encoder network.
Intuitively, when R∗AE(x) is larger, the probability of x being PA is higher, and when
R∗AE(x) is smaller, the probability of x being bonafide is higher. However, as shown
in Fig. 1, there is invalid area and speckle noise in the B-scans, which disturbs the
precision of R∗AE(x). Hence, we propose a Fine-grained Map architecture to refine the
reconstruction error, which is presented in the next section.
3.2 Refine ZSPAD Result using FineMap Architecture
In order to reduce the reconstruction error provided by trained auto-encoder network
and the influence from invalid area of B-scans, we proposed Fine-grained Map (FineMap)
architecture in this section.
For a CNN, the output of each convolution layer is the input of the next convolution
layer,
fi+1 = conv(fi, θi) (5)
where, fi is the ith layer’s output(feature map), θi is the parameters of the ith convo-
lution layer and conv is the operation of convolution. Among them, fi ∈ RH,W,C , H
and W is the height and width of the feature map and C is the number of the feature
maps. This process continuously extract and transfer the features. Hence the feature
map fi should be related to the target of the network. In ZSPAD, an auto-encoder is
utilized to reconstruct the B-scans. Since B-scans are composed of invalid region and
ROI, the fi should be related to the ROI. Considering the correlation between the fea-
ture map f of FAE and the ROI of x, we propose a fine-grained saliency map extraction
method, namely FineMap. Fig. 4 shows the pipeline of FineMap. Because the output of
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Fig. 4. The Architecture of FineMAP and the corresponding auto-encoder network architecture:
The orange part is encoder, the green part is decoder and the red part corresponds to the FineMap
architecture
decoder is more relevant to the reconstructed image, the feature maps are utilized for
fine-grained map extraction. Specifically, we average the feature map along the channel
dimension to obtain the saliency map of each layer,
MAPi =
1
C
C∑
c
resize(fH,W,ci ) (6)
where MAPi is the saliency map of the ith layer, resize is the resize function based on
bilinear interpolation and MAPi ∈ RHx,Wx . (Hx,Wx) is the size of the x. Then the
fine-grained saliency map of the x can be obtained by the process,
MAPx =
1
I
I∑
i
MAPi (7)
In this process, MAPx is the saliency map for x and I is the layer number of the
decoder. As can be seen, MAPx provides ROI based pixel-wise weight for both x
and F ∗AE(x). The weight presents the importance of the corresponding pixel. Thus, the
reconstruction error can be refined by,
Rˆ∗AE(x) = ||FAE(x, θˆ) ◦MAPx − x ◦MAPx||2 (8)
where Rˆ∗AE(x) is the refined reconstruction error and ◦ refers to the Hadamard product.
By using FineMap, the pixels in ROI have higher weight, while the pixels in invalid
area have lower weight for the evaluation of the reconstruction error. Hence, the re-
fined reconstruction error Rˆ∗AE(x) is more precise and feasible for presentation attack
detection.
Considering multiple B-scans (400 B-scans) obtained from one-scan, it is lack of
robustness for presentation attack detection with single B-scan. Therefore we subse-
quently propose the specific confidence score for PAD using Gaussian Model based on
multiple B-scans.
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3.3 Confidence Score for ZSPAD using Gaussian Model
Different from many shot task, ZSPAD can not utilize general classifiers(e.g., support
vector machine and multilayer perceptron) for detection. On the other side, the data
of PAD is out of the ordinary, i.e., multiple B-scans is derived at one-scan. Hence, in
this section, we discussed the confidence score based on Gaussian Model. Specifically,
Section 3.3 presents the establishment of Gaussian Model using multiple B-scans. And
we discussed the confidence score based on statistical feature of Gaussian Model in
Section 3.3 and the confidence score using probability density of Gaussian Model in
Section 3.3.
Multi B-scans based Gaussian Model In order to improve the robustness of the pro-
posed ZSPAD model, we propose a Gaussian Model G. Considering multi B-scans
obtained from only one-scan, we can define G as,
G(Rˆ∗AE(x),m, s) = PG(x), x ∈ Sscan (9)
where m is the mean value, s is the standard deviation, Sscan is the set of the obtained
B-scans through one-scan and PG is the probability density of the Rˆ∗AE(x). Among
them, both m and s can represent the statistical features of Rˆ∗AE in Sscan. When Sscan
is bonafide, Rˆ∗AE is small and stable. Thus, m and s is small. For PAIs, Rˆ
∗
AE is larger
and unstable. So, PAIs’ m and s should be larger than the bonafides’ m and s. Hence,
Gaussian Model is reasonable and feasible for ZSPAD.
To evaluate the m and s of the Rˆ∗AE(x) in Sscan, we employ the maximum likeli-
hood estimation(MLE) to optimize the G and the objective function is given by,
min
m,s
∏
x∈Sscan
PG(x) (10)
For each Sscan, we can get its analytical solution m∗ and s∗ through the above formula
and we defined m∗ and s∗ as Mean Feature and STD Feature correspondingly. Hence,
we obtain the optimal probability density function PˆG(x), i.e., Gaussian Model PG(x)
with m∗ and s∗. Compared with Rˆ∗AE(x), PˆG(x) consider multi B-scans for PAD and
solve the problem caused by fluctuation of single image. The robustness of ZSPAD-
Model is further improved.
Confidence Score based on Statistical Feature In this section, we discussed the con-
fidence score based on the statistical features m∗ and s∗ for presentation attack detec-
tion.Specifically, 4 confidence scores, S-Score, M-Score, S+M-Score and MS-Score are
discussed in this section.
Through the Gaussian Model mentioned above, we can get m∗i , s
∗
i ∈ Sscore. Sscore
is the data set inlcuding bonafide without PAIs and Sscore ∩ Smodel = ∅. m∗i and s∗i
reflect the statistical feature (i.e., mean and standard deviation) corresponding to various
bonafides. Hence it is utlilized for ZSPAD, we normalize them and define M-Score &
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S-Score as,
Scores =
|mtest −m∗|
m∗max −m∗
(11)
Scorem =
|stest − s∗|
s∗max − s∗
(12)
where Scorem & Scores correspond to M-Score & S-Score, mtest & stest are the
test samples’ m∗ & s∗ and m∗ & s∗ are the averages of m∗i , s
∗
i ∈ Sscore. We de-
fine the distance between the farthest deviation value(m∗max and s
∗
max) and the cen-
ter in Sscore(m∗ and s∗) as the denominator to normalize the m∗i , s
∗
i ∈ Sscore. The
larger value of M-Score & S-Score, the higher probability that subject is PA. The
thresholds(M-threshold and S-threshold) for M-Score and S-Score can be dynamically
defined by the requirments for the risk. This method effectively utilizes the data infor-
mation with multi values of mean and standard deviation and both M-Score and S-Score
have the same order of magnitude. Thus, we can define S+M-Score as,
ScoreS+M =
1
2
(Scores + Scorem) (13)
where Scores+m corresponds to S+M-Score. As can be seen, both feature m∗ and s∗
are considered by S+M-Score. However, simple addition may destroy their respective
characteristics. And the weighted mean can not be utilized for this topic because of
the Zero-PA setting. Thus, we propose a novel strategy to achieve the joint judgment
of these two features. We evaluate S-Score and M-Score separately, and build a voting
model(MS-Score) for ZSPAD,
ScoreMS=
{
Bona Scores≤Sthres, Scorem≤Mthres
PAI others
(14)
where Bona refers to the bonafide, Sthres and Mthres corresponds to S-threshold and
M-threshold respectively. When the S-Score of the subject is lower than the S-threshold
and M-Score is lower than the M-threshold, the subject will be identified as bonafide.
Otherwise, the subject will be detected as PA, i.e., each score has the power of veto
in this voting model. MS-Score ensures the effective utilization of each feature and
improves the performance of the ZSPAD-Model.
Confidence Score based on Probability Density In this section, we present the confi-
dence score based on probability density. Considering the relationship between PˆG(x)
and the presentation attack detection, ZSPAD can be reduced to the evaluation of dif-
ference between PˆscoreG (x) and PˆtestG (x). PˆscoreG (x) is the Gaussian Model obtained
from Sscore and PˆtestG (x) refers to the probability distribution of the test samples. The
stronger difference between the two probability distributions, the higher probability
that subject is PA. We propose two methods to evaluate this difference degree. The first
method utilizes the probability density directly, and it is defined as,
PD-PostP = E(PˆscoreG (xtest)), xtest ∈ Sscan (15)
PD-PreP = PˆscoreG (E(xtest)), xtest ∈ Sscan (16)
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where PD-PostP and PD-PreP is the confidence score for presentation attack detection
and xtest is the test B-scan. Both PD-PostP and PD-PreP utilizes the probability density
of the PˆscoreG (x). The larger PD-PostP and PD-PreP, the higher probability that subject
is bonafide. The difference between them is the evaluation order of the expectation for
test sample.
Confidence Score based on Divergence The second method to evaluate the difference
between PˆscoreG (x) and PˆtestG (x) is based on the divergence. Specifically, Kullback-
Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) and Intersection over Union (IoU) based diver-
gence are utilized for confidence score. Since KL-divergence is asymmetric, we con-
sider both case for KL-divergence and the confidence scores are defined as,
KL-Pre = KL(PˆscoreG ||PˆtestG ) (17)
KL-Post = KL(PˆtestG ||PˆscoreG ) (18)
where KL refers to the KL-divergence, and KL-Pre & KL-Post are the confidence
scores based on KL-divergence. When KL-Pre and KL-Post is larger, the higher proba-
bility that test sample is PA.
For Gaussian Model, IoU based divergence function is also considered in this paper.
The ratio of overlap region to total region of two Gaussian Models is usefule to present
the difference between the two models. Therefore, we define an IOU-Score as,
IOU-Score =
PˆscoreG ∩ PˆtestG
PˆscoreG ∪ PˆtestG
(19)
Since IOU-Score reflects the similarity between the two probability distribution, when
the IOU score is large, the similarity between the two models is higher and the higher
the probability that the test sample is a real sample.
The proposed confidence scores mentioned above have their own advantages and
disadvantages. It is difficult to determine whether one of them is most suitable for ZS-
PAD. Therefore, we carry out a series of experiments in the following Section to discuss
the confidence scores.
4 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we present the results of the above proposed methods and the comparison
with the learning based method [28] & feature based method [12]. In the Section 4.1, we
give the implementation details for our proposed method. Section 4.2 shows the ablation
study and the effectiveness of the proposed confidence scores. Finally, in Section 4.3,
we present the comparison with the existing methods.
4.1 Data Set and Implementation Details
Zero-PA Setting and Data Set for ZSPAD PAD model based on Zero-Shot learning
is quite different from traditional PAD model in terms of composition and setting of
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Transparent Silica Gel Emulsion Wood Gum
3D Unpressed
Transparent Silica Gel Plasticene Emulsion Wood Gum
3D pressed
Plasticene
Selenium Copper Gouache Inkpad
2D
Real
Fig. 5. The various samples of B-scan, including bonafides and PAIs. The first row shows the
B-scans scanned by 3D unpressed PAIs, the second row corresponds to the 3D pressed PAIs, the
third row presents the 2D PAIs’ B-scans and the fourth row give the samples from bonafides. The
columns shows different instruments for the PAIs and various bonafide samples correspondingly.
data set, Hence we firstly provide a novelty difinition of the Zero-Shot setting, namely
Zero-PA setting, and its data set for PAD problem.
Let S = {(xFi , yFi ), (xRi , yRi )} be the samples of PAD where xFi is the B-scan
of PA, xRi is the B-scan of bonafide and yi is the corresponding class label(i.e., PA or
bonafide). For PAD, we partition S into Strain and Stest. Correspondingly, let Strain =
{(xRtrain, yRtrain)} and Stest = {(xRtest, yRtest), (xFtest, yFtest)} be the partition of training
and testing sets and Stest ∩ Strain = ∅. In this way, we partition the paired data into
training and test set such that none of the PAs and bonafides from the test set occurs
in the training set (same as traditional PAD settings). On the other side, as shown in
Fig. 2(c), no PAIs are utilized in the process of ZSPAD model training and this is quite
different from the traditional PAD settings. Since the model has no access to any PAIs,
the model needs to learn latent alignments between bonafides and PAs and generalize
to perform well on the test data.
The model based on ZSL has a serious problems of bias, i.e., the probability distri-
butions of the outputs with Strain and Stest are quite different. Hence, it is difficult for
ZSPAD model to define the confidence score, which is utilized to discriminate the class
y of the input x. Specifically, it is infeasible to utilize the Strain to define the confidence
score like multi-shot learning method. On the otherside, Stest should not appear in the
process of model establishment, including the determination of confidence score. Thus,
unlike other Zero-Shot settings, Strain is further divided into Model Set Smodel and
Score Set Sscore. The Smodel is utilized to train the ZSPAD model and Sscore is uti-
lized to define the confidence score. In order to guarantee the Zero-PA setting, Sscore is
defined as a subset of Strain rather than Stest, i.e., Sscore∩Stest = ∅. And considering
about the problem of bias in ZSL, we guarantee that Sscore and Smodel do not have any
duplicate data, i.e. Sscore ∩ Smodel = ∅. The definition of Sscore requires the model
to consider the gap between the Strain and Stest. On the other side, a more objective
confidence score with better generation ability can be determined using Sscore.
In this paper, Smodel contains 41 finger samples derived from 41 bonafides to guar-
antee the diversity of the training data. Sscore consists of 16 finger samples scanned
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from only one bonafide(8 finegrs are scanned twice) to test the ZSPAD’s generaliza-
tion. Stest is utilized to test the performance of PAD, which is composed of 176 finger
samples scanned from 29 bonafides and 121 PA samples scanned from 121 PAIs. Fig.
5 shows the samples of bonafides and PAIs. PAIs can be roughly divided into three cat-
egories, 3D unpressed, 3D pressed and 2D instruments. 3D PAIs are made by the 3D
mold which is different from 2D’s and the difference between 3D unpressed and pressed
PAIs is whether it is pressed on the OCT acquisition device. In this paper, pressed and
unpressed PAIs are considered as different PAIs. Thus, the 121 PAIs consist of 20 3D
unpressed, 20 3D pressed and 81 2D PAIs. For the size of data, each sample contains
400 B-scans, each B-scan consists of 1500 A-lines and the length of each A-line is 500
pixels. Therefore, each finger sample is a cube with size 400×1500×500.
Implementation Details Our implementation is based on the public platform Tensorflow[1].
We initialize the weights in each layer from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
standard deviation 0.02. The Adam optimizer[23] is utilized for our auto-encoder. Con-
cretely, the learning rate of the Adam’s is set to 5× 10−5. β1 and β2 of Adam are set to
0.9 and 0.999 respectively. Inspired by Maas et al.[31], the leaky relu is utilized as the
activation function for our approach. Our workstations CPU is 2.8GHz, RAM is 32 GB
and GPU is NVIDIA TITAN Xp.
4.2 The Effectiveness of ZSPAD-Model
ZSPAD-Base (Noisy Data) ZSPAD-FineMap (Noisy Data)
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Fig. 6. The ablation study of ZSPAD Model: the abscissa is S-Score, the ordinate is M-Score
and each point corresponds to a sample(green points are the bonafides and red points are the
PAs). ZSPAD-Base is our proposed baseline without ROI extraction and ZSPAD-FineMap is our
proposed model using FineMap architecture.
Fig. 6 shows the distribution of the Stest samples in the hyperspace of the M-Score
and S-Score. In the following part, as shown in Fig.6, we defined ZSPAD-Base as our
baseline without refining and ZSPAD-FineMap as the proposed model using FineMap
architecture. Intuitively, in the confidence score space(see Fig.6), our proposed model
aggregate the samples of the bonafides effectively. Taken as a whole, ZSPAD-Base and
ZSPAD-FineMap have less outliers than ZSPAD-Patch, especially in the view of S-
Score. Noted that in Fig. 6(c)(d), the ZSPAD-FineMap has better generalization ability
than ZSPAD-Base, which is reflected in the more uniform distribution of PAI points
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and the less number of the PA points are close to the bonafides. On the other side, the
influence of denosing for ZSPAD is important. Fig. 6(a)(b) show the results with noise
and Fig. 6(c)(d) show the results without noise. As can be seen, the noise reduction
has a clustering effect on the bonafide points and promotes the performance of ZS-
PAD. As shown in TABLE 1, we make a quantitative analysis of our proposed model.
Table 1. The Ablation Study of ZSPAD-Model
Statistical feature Probability Density Divergence
Err. TPR(%)@FPR=10% TPR(%)@FPR=5% Err. TPR@FPR=10% TPR@FPR=5% Err. TPR@FPR=10% TPR@FPR=5%
ZSPAD-Base(noise) 0.0741 92.05 75.00 0.0744 69.32 23.86 0.1616 71.59 57.39
ZSPAD-FineMap(noise) 0.0572 95.45 51.70 0.1010 26.70 6.25 0.3401 18.75 13.07
ZSPAD-Base(denoise) 0.0572 92.05 73.86 0.0640 96.02 55.11 0.0842 85.22 62.50
ZSPAD-FineMap(denoise) 0.0471 97.73 93.18 0.0572 97.16 63.64 0.1145 86.36 62.50
Three evaluation metrics are considered in this ablation study: Error(Err.), True Pos-
itive Rate(TPR)@False Positive Rate(FPR)=10% and TPR@FPR=5%. Among them,
Err. reflects the best classification performance of the model. The lower Err., the bet-
ter the performance of the model is. TPR@FPR=10% or 5% represents the percentage
of bonafides are able to access to the system when the accept rate of PAs ≤ 10% or
5%. Statistical feature mentioned in TABLE 1 corresponds to the MS-Score, Proba-
bility Density refers to PD-PostP and Divergence is KL-Post. All of them empirically
achieved the best result among their own kinds of confidence scores (i.e., statistical feat-
ture based, probability density based and divergence based confidence scores). From the
TABLE 1 and Fig. 6, we can draw the following conclusions: (i) Confidence score plays
a major role for the performance the ZSPAD-Model and statistical feature based confi-
dence score (i.e., MS-Score) is the best confidence score for ZSPAD. (ii) the denoising
process is important for ZSPAD, which is remarkable in different score setting; (iii)
FineMap architecture is effective, which can further improve the precision of our pro-
posed model. (iv) ZSPAD-FineMap is the state of the art for Zero-Shot Presentation At-
tack, which achieves Err=0.0471, TPR = 97.73%@FPR = 10% and TPR=93.18%@FPR
= 5% using MS-Score;
On the other side, experimental results show that the precision of the model is
greatly affected by the confidence score. Hence, we discussed the relationship between
confidence score and the performance of our proposed model in detail. TABLE 2 shows
the performance of our ZSPAD-Model(using FineMap) based on various case, includ-
ing statistical feature, probability density and divergence based confidence score. As
can be seen, different scores have a great influence on the results. Single S-Score can’t
achieve good results, but S-Score and M-Score are complementary, i.e., the perfor-
mance of MS-Score is better than both of single scores. For probability density based
confidence score, PD-PostP overperforms the PD-PreP. This indicates that the order of
the expectation evaluation is important for the detection result. In the divergence based
case, The confidence score can achieve the similar value to the above mentioned con-
fidence scores in the term of Err.. But for more strict metrics, TPR@FPR=10% and
TPR@FPR=5%, the performance of Divergence based confidence score is poorer than
the others. In short, the preformance of both probability density and divergence based
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Table 2. The Performance of ZSPAD-Model using different Confidence Score
Confidence Score Err. TPR(%)@FPR=10% TPR(%)@FPR=5%
Statistical Feature based
S-Score 0.1178 53.98 15.91
M-Score 0.0539 96.59 81.25
M + S-Score 0.0673 92.05 86.36
MS-Score 0.0471 97.73 93.18
Probability Density based
PD-PostP 0.0572 97.16 63.64
PD-PreP 0.0673 93.18 53.41
Divergence based
KL-Pre 0.2828 41.48 17.61
KL-Post 0.1145 86.36 62.50
IoU-Score 0.0943 3.98 0
confidence scores are poorer than the MS-Score, which indicates MS-Score is more ro-
bust than the other confidence score and is empirically most suitable confidence score
for ZSPAD.
4.3 Comparison with Existing Methods
In this section, we compare our model with existing methods. TABLE 3 shows the result
of the comparison. Since our best-performing model is given by FineMap and MS-Score
mentioned in TABLE 1, we use this model, namely ZSPAD-Model, by default in other
parts of the paper unless noted. Learning based method [12] depends on the training
set, which includes both positive and negative samples, for parameter adjustment. The
training set of the learning model consists of the PAIs from Stest and the bonafides.
Therefore, the test set is composed of the unused samples in Stest. The rate mentioned
in TABLE 3 is the percentage of the number of the utilized PAIs for training to the
number of whole PAIs in Sscore. The samples for training are selected randomly and
the number of positive samples(i.e., bonafide) is same as the number of PAIs. In order
to ensure the fairness of the experiment, the test set of ZSPAD-Model, Feature Based
Method and learning based method are the same.
Table 3. Comparison with Existing Methods
@Rate=30% @Rate=50%
Err. TPR(%)@FPR=10% TPR(%)@FPR=5% Err. TPR@FPR=10% TPR@FPR=5%
Feature Based Method[28] 0.1245 84.66 81.82 0.1271 84.66 81.82
Learning Based Method[12] 0.0667 90.55 90.55 0.0472 95.18 94.81
ZSPAD-Model 0.0311 100.00 97.73 0.0254 98.86 96.59
As shown in TABLE 3, our proposed method overperforms the state of the art. In the
case, where rate = 30%, ZSPAD-Model achieves Err=0.0311, TPR = 100.00%@FPR
= 10% and TPR=97.73%@FPR = 5% on the test set, exceeding other methods Err =
0.0667/0.1245, TPR = 90.55/84.66%@FPR = 10% and TPR=90.55/81.82%@FPR =
5% by 0.0356/0.0934, 9.45/15.34% and 7.18/15.91% respectively. Our model is not
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only trained without any PAIs, but also surpasses existing methods significantly. This
further proves the effectiveness of our model.
On the otherside, as shown in TABLE 3, the performance of the feature based
method is stable but poor. This shows that the feature based method has a strong gen-
eralization, but the security is at weakly low level. And the performance of learning
based method is improved with the increase of rate, which reflects its dependence on
the data scale. However, our proposed model does not have these issues. In order to
further prove the effectiveness of our model, two different case with more details are
provided in the following section. In Section 4.3, we presents the detection result of fea-
ture based method and ZSPAD-Model for various PA. And we summarize the pros and
cons of feature based method, focusing on its complementarity and low security. Sec-
tion 4.3) shows the data scale dependence of learning based method and the high-level
generalization of ZSPAD-Model.
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Fig. 7. The special presentation attack for depth-double-peak feature based method. (a). The B-
scans of bonafide and the presentation attack using unpressed silica gel. (b). First row: the real
and deceptive double-depth-peak features represented in the A-line. Second row: the gaussian
distributions of the bonafide and unpressed silica gel using the proposed ZSPAD-Model.
Comparison with Feature based Method Next we evaluate the feature based method
[28] in Stest. We discussed feature based method from two aspect, limitation and com-
plementarity.
Limitation: Liu et al. [28] proposed method is based on feature. For this feature, we
propose a special type PA, i.e., 3D unpressed PAIs. Fig. 7 shows the special presentation
attack for depth-double-peak feature based method. The strategy to attack this method
is to utilize the unpressed silica gel to place it lightly on the acquisition device. The
supported lense and the PAI form a deceptive depth-double-peak feature(see Fig. 7).
Therefore, the method [28] is difficult to identify this kind of PA. The security of feature
based method is relatively low. Once the feature utilized for PAD is seen, the purpose
of deception will be achieved from the kind of PAI or the acquisition method(e.g. the
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case we discussed in this section). But for our proposed method, it is hard to achieve
PA using different types of attacks. In Fig. 7, the gaussian distributions of the bonafide
and unpressed silica gel are quite different and can be detected easily.
Table 4. Comparison with Feature based Method for Various PAs
Case Assessment Feature based Method [28] ZSPAD-Model
2D PA
Err. 0.1042 0.0000
TPR(%)@FPR=10% 0.8466 100.00
TPR(%)@FPR=5% 0.8466 100.00
3D-pressed PA
Err. 0.0872 0.0462
TPR(%)@FPR=10% 27.27 74.43
TPR(%)@FPR=5% 0.00 27.27
3D-unpressed PA
Err. 0.0923 0.0410
TPR(%)@FPR=10% 32.95 81.82
TPR(%)@FPR=5% 18.18 52.84
Average
Err. 0.1279 0.0471
TPR(%)@FPR=10% 84.66 97.73
TPR(%)@FPR=5% 53.98 93.18
Meanwhile, we compare ZSPAD-Model and the feature based method on various
cases. TABLE 4 shows the results, and our proposed method overperforms the feature
based method in every case remarkablely. Noted that, feature based method can achieve
100% to detect the 2D PAIs, but in order to be compatible with 3D PAIs, we fine-tuning
the hyper parameters(e.g. search scope) of the method.
Table 5. Complementarity between ZSPAD-Model and Feature based Method
Err. TPR(%)@FPR=10% TPR(%)@FPR=5%
Feature based Method[28] 0.1279 84.66 53.98
ZSPAD-Model 0.0471 97.73 93.18
Fusion Method 0.0438 100.00 96.02
Complementarity: On the other side, we discuss the complementarity between fea-
ture based method and ours. TABLE 5 shows the performance of fusion method. The
fusion method is on the basic of voting model. When ZSPAD-Model and feature based
method recognize the input as bonafide at the same time, the final detection result is
positive and other cases are detected as PA. As can be seen, fusion method overper-
forms any single method, and achieve 100% in the TPR@FPR=10%. This proves the
high-level complementarity between feature based method and ours.
Comparison with Learning based Method We now present the results of the learning
based method [12]. TABLE 6 shows the performance of the learning based method with
different train rate. Specifically, in order to ensure the fairness of the experiment, the
test set of ZSPAD-Model and learning based method are identical in each case. As
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Table 6. Comparison with Learning based Method with Various Train Rate of Data Set
Err. TPR(%)@FPR=10% TPR(%)@FPR=10%
Learning Based Method@rate=5% 0.3645 4.96 1.33
ZSPAD-Model@rate=5% 0.0481 96.59 91.48
Learning Based Method@rate=15% 0.3407 29.06 26.25
ZSPAD-Model@rate=15% 0.0386 98.86 93.75
Learning Based Method@rate=25% 0.1457 73.27 62.59
ZSPAD-Model@rate=25% 0.0358 98.86 96.59
Learning Based Method@rate=30% 0.0667 90.55 90.55
ZSPAD-Model@rate=30% 0.0311 100.00 97.73
Learning Based Method@rate=50% 0.0472 95.18 94.81
ZSPAD-Model@rate=50% 0.0254 98.86 96.59
Learning Based Method@rate=80% 0.0043 99.68 99.63
ZSPAD-Model@rate=80% 0.0323 97.73 91.48
shown in TABLE 6, the performance of learning based method is improved gradually
with the increasing rate. And ZSPAD-Model is basically stable under various different
test sets. This shows the method based on learning model has a strong dependence on
the number of data and is lack of generalization. When rate = 50%, learning based
method achieves the similar result with ZSPAD-Model for the first time. This proves
that the performance of this unsupervised method(i.e., ZSPAD) is ideal, which can even
surpass the supervised learning method in the case of small and medium data scale.
There is no denying that with the increasing of training data, learning based method
should overperform ours(rate = 80%). However, it is difficult to collect PAIs in realistic
application. So, in any case, our method is still practical and enlightening.
PA: Transparent Silica Gel
FineROI: Transparent Silica Gel
(a) (b)
0.0              0.4               0.8             1.2
Reconstruction Error
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
D
en
sit
y
1e-8
1e8
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Fig. 8. Failure case for ZSPAD-Model: (a) First row: the B-scan of PA made by transparent silica
gel. Second row: the ROI for the transparent silica gel using ZSPAD-Model (b) The gaussian
distribution of the reconstruction error of the transparent silica gel on the basic of ZSPAD-Model.
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5 Conclusion & Future Work
This paper proposed a novel Zero-Shot Presentation Attack Detection framework to
guarantee the generalization of the PAD model. By defining the Zero-PA setting, we
urge the model to reduce the dependence on the presentation attack data. Specifically,
an auto-encoder(AE) network is trained to reconstruct bonafide B-scans, and the trained
model is utilized to evaluate the reconstruction error of PA and bonafide B-scan. Since
there is high-level noise and invalid areas in B-scan image disturbing the reconstruction
error, we propose a Fine-grained Map architecture(FineMap) to provide a constraint for
B-scan in order to refine the obtained reconstruction error. Then we utilized the Gaus-
sian Model to estimate the probability density of the reconstruction errors of a finger-
tips. Finally, three detection methods including, statistical feature, probability density
and divergence based confidence scores are proposed for ZSPAD. Experimental results
showed that the ZSPAD-Model is the state of the art for ZSPAD, and the MS-Score is
the best confidence score. Compared with existing methods, our proposed method has
stronger robustness, generalization ability and higher accuracy. Especially, in a small
and medium data scale, the performance of ZSPAD-Model even exceeds the supervised
learning method.
Although, our method has a good performance compared with the existing PAD
method, TABLE 1 shows that the problem of PAD can not be solved completely by
ZSPAD-Model. Hence, we analyzed the PAIs that failed to be detected and find that
the failure causes are consistent. In this section, we take the PAI made by transparent
silica gel as an example to discuss the limitation of our method. Fig. 8 shows this PAI
and the result of our method. As can be seen, there is a small ROI in the B-scan of the
transparent silica gel and this leads to the failure of the FineMap. Fig.8(a) presents the
result of FineMap, and it can be seen that FineMap do not extract any valid information
for ZSPAD-Model. The failure ROI extraction leads to the small reconstruction error,
which leads to the similarity gaussian distribution between PA and bonafide(see Fig.
8(b)). And this problem eventually influences the result of our method. Therefore, in our
future work, we will further investigate how to reduce the dependence of our method
on ROI extraction for more accurate ZSPAD.
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